

Immigration and the political behavior of immigrant-background Americans ^{*}

Vasiliki Fouka[†] Marco Tabellini[‡] Ernesto Tiburcio[§]

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Abstract

We study the political behavior of Americans with immigrant backgrounds, a growing group that accounts for over 20% of eligible voters. Using voter registration records from three states that report birthplace, we characterize voting registration patterns among 7 million naturalized and second-generation immigrants relative to U.S.-born whites between 2014 and 2024. We document a broad Republican realignment among immigrant-background Americans. We then examine whether rising unauthorized immigration, a salient development of the past decade, contributed to this shift. Using Mexican consular data on migrant flows from Mexican municipalities to U.S. counties and origin push shocks, we construct predicted county-level inflows of unauthorized migrants. We find that counties with larger undocumented inflows experienced greater increases in Republican registration among naturalized and second-generation voters relative to U.S.-born whites in the same county and year. These effects are strongest among Hispanic voters. We provide suggestive evidence that social mechanisms related to status and fairness account for these patterns, while economic competition appears to play a more limited role.

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[†]Department of Political Science, Stanford University, CEPR and NBER. vfouka@stanford.edu

[‡]Harvard Business School, CEPR, and NBER. mtabellini@hbs.edu

[§]University of California, Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy. ernesto.tiburcio@berkeley.edu

1 Introduction

In 2024, 25 million adults in the United States eligible to vote were born abroad (Ruggles et al., 2025), and another 24 million voters had at least one foreign-born parent (Flood et al., 2025). Together, first- and second-generation immigrants accounted for roughly 20% of the U.S. electorate. Historically, naturalized citizens and the children of immigrants have been more likely to support the Democratic Party. Yet recent survey evidence and anecdotal accounts suggest that naturalized citizens and ethnically minority voters—including Hispanics—shifted toward the Republican Party over the past decade, contributing in part to the 2024 electoral outcomes (Frimpong and Sanchez, 2024; Nowrasteh and Chanwong, 2025; Hamel et al., 2025). This shift appears to have occurred despite the explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric of the contemporary Republican Party and mirrors the broader conservative turn observed among U.S.-born White voters. Does this apparent change in political attitudes translate into changes in political behavior, and if so, what explains it?

In this paper, we examine the political behavior of Americans with immigrant background. We assemble voter registration records for more than 20 million US-born and foreign-born citizens across three states—California, North Carolina, and Nebraska—between 2014 and 2024. The cornerstone of our analysis is the voter file compiled by L2, which covers all registered voters in the United States and is updated after each general election. In addition to basic demographic information, these three states record each voter’s place of birth, allowing us to identify naturalized Americans. As we document below, these demographic estimates correlate closely with administrative statistics on citizenship and immigration. The longitudinal structure of the data further allows us to trace changes in party registration at the person level across election cycles.

We begin by presenting descriptive evidence on the evolution of Republican registration by origin and ethnicity between 2014 and 2024. Figure 1 plots changes in the share of registered Republicans relative to 2014, separately for naturalized voters, second-generation voters, and U.S.-born White voters. Republican registration declined across all groups between 2014 and 2018. After 2018, however, partisan trajectories diverged sharply. Naturalized and second-generation voters became increasingly more likely to register as Republicans, while Republican registration among U.S.-born White voters recovered much more gradually. By 2024, immigrant-background voters had experienced substantially larger increases in Republican registration than U.S.-born Whites. Overall, Figure 1 documents a clear partisan realignment among voters with immigrant backgrounds, with naturalized voters and U.S.-born Hispanics exhibiting the largest shifts toward the Republican Party.

One prominent explanation for the recent Republican gains among immigrant-background

and minority voters emphasizes local economic conditions, inflation, and crime (Fraga et al., 2025; Frimpong and Sanchez, 2024; Arteaga and Barone, 2025). We find little support for this interpretation. The rightward shift among naturalized and second-generation voters persists after accounting for a rich set of geographic controls and time-varying county-level characteristics, including unemployment, sectoral employment composition, income, and crime. If anything, adjusting for local economic and geographic conditions slightly strengthens the estimated effects, indicating that differential exposure to these local shocks cannot account for the observed partisan realignment.

We further address the possibility that the trends in Figure 1 reflect changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in political behavior. For example, immigrant-background voters may differ systematically from U.S.-born White voters in age, income, or other demographic characteristics, or may experience different life-cycle dynamics over time. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the data to follow the same voters across election cycles, we show that the results are unchanged when including individual fixed effects, which isolate within-person changes in party registration. The findings are also robust when restricting attention to a stable sample of consistent voters.

We then turn to a factor that has featured prominently in anecdotal and media accounts as a potential explanation for the trends documented in Figure 1: unauthorized immigration.¹ Immigration has risen sharply in recent years, driven in part by a surge in unauthorized arrivals. A large literature has shown that immigration can fuel support for right-wing parties in both the United States and Europe (Alesina and Tabellini, 2024). Yet most existing studies estimate average effects across the electorate, without separating the responses of immigrants and their descendants from those of native-born voters. As a result, we know little about whether migration inflows affect the political behavior of immigrants themselves and their descendants. Ex ante, the direction of such effects is ambiguous. On the one hand, a migrant background may foster empathy with newcomers and support for more open migration policies (Dinas et al., 2021; Gihleb et al., 2022). On the other, long-settled immigrants are often the closest substitutes for new arrivals and may experience economic competition (Borjas, 1987; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). They may also have social or psychological incentives to distance themselves from recent migrants—both to preserve relative status and to avoid discrimination—particularly when natives perceive immigration as threatening.

To test these ambiguous predictions, we exploit variation in unauthorized Mexican immigration across U.S. counties between 2014 and 2024. The longitudinal structure of the voter file allows us to estimate how changes in local migration inflows translate into within-

¹For example, Frimpong and Sanchez (2024) have documented the growing salience of immigration and the rightward drift among long-settled immigrant voters during the 2024 cycle.

individual changes in party registration, controlling for voter fixed effects and group-specific partisan trends. Our analysis focuses on a stable set of consistent voters—individuals observed in multiple election cycles—which allows us to abstract from changes driven by entry into or exit from the electorate and to isolate genuine shifts in political behavior over time. Within this framework, we ask whether exposure to unauthorized migration increases the likelihood that naturalized and second-generation voters register as Republicans, and whether these responses differ relative to U.S.-born White voters—the largest and most politically stable demographic group.

To address potential endogeneity in observed migration flows, we follow [Tiburcio and Camarena \(2023\)](#) and predict biennial county-level inflows of unauthorized Mexican migrants using a shift-share design leveraging data from the Mexican Consular system. Although inflows from Central and South America increased substantially during our study period, Mexico remained the largest single country of origin for recent migrants in the states we study. In California, roughly 18% of immigrants who had arrived within the previous two years were born in Mexico, while the corresponding share was about 15% in Nebraska and North Carolina—larger than for any other country of origin ([Ruggles et al., 2025](#)).

The Mexican Consular system records both migrants’ municipality of origin in Mexico and county of residence in the United States, allowing us to combine pre-existing municipality–county migrant networks (shares) with municipality-level outflows (shifts) driven by local economic and climatic conditions in Mexico. Unlike data sources such as the American Community Survey, which identify recent immigrants only at the national level, the consular data provide municipality-level origin information, enabling us to exploit plausibly exogenous subnational migration shocks. To further mitigate concerns that historical migrant networks may be correlated with unobserved county characteristics, we implement the re-centering correction proposed by [Borusyak and Hull \(2023\)](#), which purges the instrument of systematic exposure by subtracting its average value under randomly reassigned municipality-level shocks.

Our identifying variation therefore comes from comparing changes in party registration among voters with different backgrounds within the same county and election year. By controlling for county-by-year fixed effects, we absorb all shocks common to voters living in the same local environment. Voter fixed effects and group-specific state-by-year trends further account for permanent differences across individuals and differential partisan trends across demographic groups. We therefore compare naturalized and second-generation voters who are more exposed to predicted migration inflows with otherwise similar voters who are less exposed, relative to U.S.-born White voters facing the same local conditions. This design assumes that, conditional on these controls, immigrant-background and U.S.-born

White voters would have followed similar differential partisan trajectories across counties absent new unauthorized migration.

We find that unauthorized immigration differentially increased the likelihood of Republican registration among naturalized and second-generation voters during the 2014 and 2024 electoral cycles. A 0.034-percentage-point increase in the instrument,² corresponding to the average (absolute) change in inflows between elections, raises the probability of Republican registration by 0.19 percentage points among naturalized voters, and 0.16 percentage points for second-generation voters. This equals about 9% of these groups’ average increase in Republican registration between elections over 2014–2024.

These results are robust to a wide range of checks. First, there is no association between current Republican registration and future, (unrealized) migration inflows, alleviating concerns of a pre-trend. Second, they hold when allowing for heterogeneous county-level trends in key political, economic, and demographic characteristics, including baseline Republican vote share, unemployment, income, poverty, and population composition. Third, they persist when clustering standard errors at alternative geographic and individual levels, and when excluding observations with inconsistent or missing birthplace information. Fourth, the findings are similar when analyzing each state separately and when considering alternative measures of partisan affiliation, including Democratic and Independent registration.

We then investigate the mechanisms behind these responses. A natural explanation is economic competition: established immigrants may oppose new arrivals because they compete in similar labor markets. However, our evidence provides little support for this mechanism. Republican shifts are largest among second-generation Hispanic voters, a group that is among the least economically substitutable with undocumented Mexican migrants. Moreover, undocumented immigration has only modest effects on household income, and the largest estimated income losses occur among naturalized voters, who exhibit comparatively smaller Republican shifts.

Instead, the evidence points toward social mechanisms. We first examine whether concerns about social status and identity shape political responses. The strongest Republican shifts occur among voters who are culturally closest to undocumented Mexican migrants, consistent with the idea that established immigrants and their descendants seek to distance themselves from a stigmatized group. Among naturalized voters, this response is significantly stronger in politically less welcoming areas, where anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to be more salient. This pattern is consistent with immigrants distancing themselves from newer arrivals in environments where they are more likely to experience hostility or discrimination.

²In a county of 1,000,000 people, this is equivalent to going from a predicted inflow of 5,000 in one electoral year to a predicted inflow of 5,340 in the following electoral year.

Finally, we consider whether changes in immigration policy contributed to these responses. The expansion of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) after 2020 substantially increased the number of undocumented migrants eligible to remain and work legally in the United States. We find that the political response to unauthorized immigration is considerably stronger in counties that experienced larger predicted increases in TPS recipients, particularly among second-generation Hispanic voters. These findings are consistent with the idea that changes in humanitarian protections heightened concerns about fairness in the administration of immigration policy, contributing to the broader Republican shift among voters with immigrant backgrounds.

Our findings speak to existing studies on the political economy of migration ([Alesina and Tabellini, 2024](#)). A central finding of this work is that immigration often—but not always—triggers political backlash, increasing support for right-wing or anti-immigrant parties, with cultural distance and group identification playing a key role. We complement this literature by moving beyond aggregate estimates and examining how different populations respond politically to the arrival of newcomers. By focusing on established migrants, we also contribute to research on the redefinition of in-group and out-group boundaries ([Fouka and Tabellini, 2022](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)).

We also contribute to the literature on the political behavior of minorities—particularly Hispanics—and immigrants more broadly. Closely related are studies documenting the political evolution of Hispanic voters during elections in which Donald Trump was a candidate ([Fraga et al., 2025](#)). Most of this work relies on survey data rather than administrative records ([Pérez and Cobian, 2024](#)), and existing evidence on naturalized voters is largely correlational or infers political behavior indirectly from voters’ place of residence ([Antman and Duncan, 2024](#)). To our knowledge, we provide the first evidence tracking the political behavior of naturalized voters at the individual level over time. We also complement recent work by [Feigenbaum et al. \(2025\)](#), who show that U.S. legislators descended from immigrants support more permissive immigration policies. While they examine how immigrant ancestry shapes representation and policymaking, we shift attention to the demand side by studying how migration shocks influence the political behavior of immigrant-background voters.

Finally, we contribute to the growing literature using large-scale voter registration files to study political behavior. These data have been used to measure partisan sorting and geographic polarization ([Brown and Enos, 2021](#); [Brown et al., 2025](#)), analyze the relative importance of location versus individual characteristics in turnout and party affiliation ([Cantoni and Pons, 2022](#)), and estimate the effects of voting laws on party registration and turnout ([Cantoni and Pons, 2021](#)). To our knowledge, we are the first to identify foreign-born voters in voter registration data and track their political behavior over time. Moreover, we

are among the first to exploit within-address information to reconstruct families and study political behavior at the household level.

2 Background

2.1 Immigrant-background voters in the US

Voters with immigrant backgrounds are a large and growing demographic in the United States. According to the 2024 American Community Survey (ACS), 25 million eligible voters were born abroad ([Ruggles et al., 2025](#)). According to the 2024 Current Population Survey (CPS), another 24 million had at least one foreign-born parent ([Flood et al., 2025](#)). Together, first- and second-generation immigrants account for about 20% of eligible voters.

Immigrants have traditionally supported the Democratic Party at higher rates than the Republican Party. According to the 2023 KFF/LA Times Survey of Immigrants, 32% of immigrants identified as Democrats and 16% as Republicans. This gap was present across racial and ethnic groups, though it was larger among non-white immigrants ([Schumacher et al., 2023](#)). At the same time, a large share of immigrants do not identify strongly with either party: 42% of naturalized citizens report no strong partisan attachment. This makes the political preferences of immigrant-background voters less stable and harder to predict than those of non-immigrants.

Much of the literature on immigrant and minority political behavior has sought to explain why some of these voters deviate from the Democratic identification expected given the party’s more pro-immigrant and pro-minority agenda. One set of explanations treats immigrant-background voters like other demographic groups, highlighting that once socioeconomic profiles and fixed attitudes, such as religiosity, are taken into account, ethnic background itself is not a central determinant of political behavior ([Fraga et al., 2025](#)). Related work points out substantial heterogeneity within this electorate. Republican voting is predicted by attachment to an American identity and by ethnocentric attitudes, even among voters of similar ethnic backgrounds ([Geiger and Reny, 2024](#); [Pérez et al., 2025](#)).

Other studies, however, emphasize that immigrant and minority backgrounds can have a distinct influence on voters’ party identification and support. For example, experiences of discrimination have been shown to increase turnout and support for the Democratic Party among Asian American voters ([Kuo et al., 2017](#); [Chan et al., 2024](#)). At the same time, immigrant background may also increase the likelihood of identifying as Republican, either because immigrants have higher aspirations and expectations of socioeconomic mobility, which can reduce support for redistribution ([Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2011](#)), or because they were socialized in more conservative contexts that better

align with Republican values (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Just, 2019).

2.2 Immigrant background and attitudes on immigration

Immigration is among the policy issues likely to be especially salient for immigrant-background voters. In the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, the notable shift of Hispanic and other minority voters toward the Republican Party (Fraga et al., 2025) coincided with a Republican campaign centered on border security and a hardline stance on unauthorized immigration. Some journalistic accounts struggled to explain why Latino voters would support Donald Trump despite his policy positions and rhetoric on immigration, while others highlighted immigration as one factor in immigrant-background voters' Republican support, pointing to perceptions that Biden's border policies were unfair or to efforts by long-settled immigrants to distinguish themselves from new arrivals.³ These contrasting interpretations reflect a broader theoretical ambiguity in the relationship between immigrant background and immigration attitudes.

On the one hand, immigrant background may increase support for immigration and affinity toward new immigrants through psychological and social identity channels. As a shared experience or defining attribute, immigrant background may increase perceived social proximity and common group identification, consistent with models of endogenous social identity (Shayo, 2009; Fouka and Tabellini, 2025). Studies show that migrant background increases support for immigration among migrant descendants (Dinas et al., 2021; Williamson et al., 2021; Gihleb et al., 2022; Barron et al., 2023; Feigenbaum et al., 2025). In the U.S. context, a large literature also shows that immigrant-background minorities, such as Hispanics, mobilize politically in response to anti-immigrant policies or rhetoric, consistent with an identity-threat response when their group is perceived as targeted (Pantoja et al., 2001; Barreto et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2011; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017).

On the other hand, there are also reasons why immigrant-background voters may hold anti-immigrant attitudes and favor more restrictive immigration policies. Such responses may also arise through social identity channels, as members of minority groups seek to improve their social status by dissociating themselves from groups perceived as lower in the social hierarchy (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Huddy, 2003). Distancing from new immigrants may help immigrant-background voters avoid stereotyping or discrimination (Fouka and Tabellini, 2022; Kaeser and Tani, 2023), and studies show that immigration can lead people with immigrant backgrounds to identify more strongly with the host country (Lorenz, 2025). In the U.S., attempts to achieve individual, rather than collective, social mobility through

³Karol Markowicz, "I'm a Legal Immigrant: Don't You Dare Lump Me in with Border Jumpers," *New York Post*, June 12, 2025, <https://nypost.com/2025/06/12/opinion/im-a-legal-immigrant-dont-lump-me-in-with-border-jumpers/>.

assimilation are associated with greater support for restrictionist immigration policies among Latino voters (Hickel Jr et al., 2020).

Beyond these psychological channels, immigrant-background voters may also be especially likely to experience the negative economic effects of immigration, since earlier immigrants are often close labor-market substitutes for new arrivals (Borjas, 1987; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Monras, 2020) and may also face additional costs through neighborhood crowding and competition for housing. These ambiguous predictions help explain why the literature has identified substantial heterogeneity in immigrants’ attitudes toward immigration (Just and Anderson, 2015; Roman et al., 2022; Neureiter and Schulte, 2024; Velez, 2024; Wakefield, 2025).

3 Data

Federal elections in the US are administered by states rather than by a national institution. When citizens register to vote, or re-register after an address change, state governments record key information about them, which is processed and released months after each electoral cycle. Several private companies or vendors then collect, systematize, and analyze this voter-level information from all state governments. Resulting aggregated datasets are known as voter files. We use the L2 Voter and Demographic Dataset, one such commercial voter file, which provides information for every general election year from 2014 through 2024. Some of the variables included come directly from state governments — for example, date of birth and address — while others are modeled or inferred by L2 for commercial purposes — such as income, ethnicity, and marital status.

3.1 Immigrant background

Foreign-born voters. To identify voters of immigrant background, we rely on three states that consistently record place of birth for (most) registered voters: California, North Carolina, and Nebraska. The coverage and content of the variable vary substantially across states and over time. On average, between 2014 and 2024, the share of registered voters with non-missing place of birth is 89% in California, 85% in North Carolina and 50% in Nebraska. Appendix A.2.1 shows that, after cleaning and systematizing the place of birth across years within voters, the shares of missing values decrease, especially among consistent voters.⁴ A sizable share of non-missing entries contain only generic categories rather than specific countries. For example, nearly 13% of non-missing records in California simply list “foreign-born”. In North Carolina, all voters with non-missing information either contain

⁴Tables A12 and A13 indicate that counties with higher shares of voters with missing place of birth are not systematically different from those with lower shares in terms of predicted migration and vote shares.

the abbreviation of a US state (e.g. NC, CA, and NE) or OC — denoting “overseas/out of the country.” We therefore classify as naturalized Americans those voters whose place of birth is a foreign country or “foreign-born” in California and Nebraska, or “OC” in North Carolina.⁵

Second-generation voters. To identify second-generation Americans, we develop a set of rules to infer family relationships and identify children of foreign-born parents. L2 includes identifiers for people who are members of the same household. We classify as a naturalized voter’s spouse or partner a household member whose marital status is “married” or “non-traditional,” provided that the naturalized voter has the same status. When multiple household members meet these criteria, we pair those closest in age.⁶ We classify as a naturalized voter’s child any household member who shares the naturalized voter’s last name (or the spouse’s or likely partner’s last name) and is at least 18 years younger. This classification yields a lower bound of second-generation migrant voters, since it omits children of naturalized voters who did not reside with their parents at least in one electoral year during our period of study and children of unregistered naturalized voters.

Race/Ethnicity. We use information on voters’ racial and ethnic background to distinguish between the behavior of US-born whites and that of other ethnoracial groups, both native- and foreign-born. A voter’s ethnicity is modeled by L2 based on their last name and area of residence. The data include 141 possible ethnicity values (reported over 99.5% of the times). Prior studies provide evidence that this variable correlates well with alternative ethnicity estimates, such as those obtained from the Cooperative Election Study, Pew, and the American Community Census ([Fraga, 2018](#); [Pew Research Center, 2018](#)).

Sample. Using place of birth, inferred familial relationships, and race and ethnicity information, we construct four groups. The first one consists of U.S.-born whites with modeled European or Anglo ethnicity. The second group is composed of individuals born abroad who are naturalized citizens. The third group consists of second-generation voters: inferred children of naturalized voters. The fourth group consists of U.S.-born voters whose modeled ethnicity is not Anglo/European. For further analyses, we subdivide the naturalized, second-generation, and non-white U.S.-born voters into Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters.

⁵Among those who do report country of origin, only a small share (around 0.5%), show contradictory information over time (e.g. listed as “US” in 2016 and “Mexico” in 2024).

⁶“Non-traditional” relationships are defined as non-marital heterosexual two-person relationships, as L2 excludes same-sex and non-coupled partnerships. US-born voters living with naturalized voters in relationships that do not conform with this algorithm are classified as siblings or roommates.

For foreign-born voters with an actual country of birth, we classify as Hispanic those whose place of birth is in Latin America or the Caribbean. For North Carolinian voters as well as Californian and Nebraskan voters with generic “foreign-born” birthplace, we use the ethnicity variable. Finally, we drop from the sample all voters with missing place of birth.

Estimated numbers of voters by race and ethnicity correlate closely with county-level Census population counts and ACS and CPS estimates (Table A7). The largest discrepancy occurs among second-generation voters. This is expected, since our estimate relies on children being co-resident with their (naturalized) parents and therefore undercounts the true population of voters with foreign-born parents. Notably, if we focus on younger voters —18-33— (Table A8), who are more likely to have co-resided with their foreign-born parents at least once between 2014 and 2024, the correlation between our estimates and CPS’ is stronger.

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics. The dataset includes 5.5 million naturalized voters, who make up 15% of the total sample (excluding those with missing place of birth). Naturalized immigrants are comparable to U.S.-born whites in age, gender, and inferred household income. Second-generation voters are younger and somewhat more likely to be male and to have higher household income.

3.2 Party affiliation

Information on partisan affiliation is recorded for all three states of interest. Voters can update their party identification by re-registering to vote with their Secretary of State or when they change addresses, up until 15 to 25 days before an election, depending on the state. The raw variable in the voter file takes up to 70 values. We collapse these into Democrat, Republican, and Independent/Other/Unknown.⁷ On average, around 4% of voters change party affiliation between election cycles. During our study period, 11% of naturalized voters switched to or from Republican at least once — compared 15% of U.S.-born whites and 13% of non-white U.S.-born voters (Table A14).

Shifts in party affiliation likely understate electoral changes. Updating one’s party registration signals a more durable political commitment. Party registration is strongly correlated with county-level electoral outcomes, both in levels and in changes. In Appendix A.5, Table A9 presents these correlations. Specifically, Columns 5 and 6 show that, between 2014 and 2024, each additional Republican registrant in a county is associated with 2.02 and 1.42 additional Republican votes in House elections, and 1.78 and 3.09 additional Republican votes in Presidential elections, among all registered voters and among those who voted. Namely, changes in party registration capture only about half of the corresponding electoral shift.

⁷Since 2018, among consistent voters, fewer than 0.3 percent register as “Unknown.”

4 Rightward shift of immigrant-background voters

In this section, we examine how party registration has evolved for different groups of voters between 2014 and 2024. Panel A of Figure 1 presents average Republican registration rates by group over time. Panel B plots percentage-point changes relative to 2014. Republican registration is lower for all immigrant-background and non-white groups and declines until 2018. However, this trend reverses for these groups thereafter. The shift is most pronounced among naturalized voters. Relative to 2014, this group is 2 percentage points more likely to register as Republican in 2024. Figure A.4 decomposes these patterns by state and Hispanic ethnicity. The rightward shift holds for naturalized voters of any ethnicity, for U.S.-born Hispanics, and for the three states.

We next examine whether these patterns can be explained by differences in geographic, demographic or other characteristics of different voter groups. We estimate individual-level regressions of the following form:

$$Republican_{icgt} = \beta_{gt} + \alpha_g + \delta_t + \gamma\mathbf{X} + \epsilon_{icgt} \quad (1)$$

where i denotes individuals, c counties, g demographic groups of voters (U.S.-born whites, U.S.-born other, naturalized or second-generation), and t denotes years. The vector $\mathbf{X}$ includes geographic, socioeconomic, and demographic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Figure 2 presents point estimates of β from different versions of 1, relative to each group's value in 2014. Underlying regressions are presented in Appendix Table A15. Panel (a) controls for county fixed effects, showing that the Republican shift among naturalized voters after 2018 obtains within geography. Panel (b) adds controls for age and gender. Accounting for differences in demographic profiles produces a more pronounced decline in Republican registration among U.S.-born white voters and reduces the magnitude of the increase for other groups. The shift between 2014 and 2024 for naturalized voters remains close to 3 percentage points.

Panel (c) examines within-voter changes over time, while Panel (d) further restricts the sample to consistent voters: those who appear in the voter file in at least five of the six elections in our period of interest. The shift toward Republican registration is mainly driven by this subgroup, consistent with younger generations and new voters voting more progressively. When we focus on consistent voters, all immigrant-background and non-white groups become more likely to register as Republican after 2018, with naturalized voters displaying the steepest change and a net average shift toward Republican registration by 2020.




Figure 1: Evolution of partisan registration by group




Figure 2: Evolution of partisan registration with covariates. Plotted are estimates corresponding to different β from regression 1. Panel a only controls for state fixed effects. Panel b controls for county by gender fixed effects and age. Panels c and d control for individual fixed effects. Panel d is additionally restricted to consistent voters. The standard errors are close to zero given the number of observations.

Overall, these patterns indicate that the Republican shift among voters with immigrant backgrounds, and particularly among foreign-born voters, cannot be fully explained by differences in groups' locations or demographics, or by changes over time in the composition of these groups. The post-2018 change is most pronounced among consistent voters and, for naturalized voters, results in a net increase in Republican registration of close to 4 percentage points over 10 years.

5 The role of unauthorized immigration

Unauthorized migration into the United States increased steadily until 2007, when the undocumented immigrant population is estimated to have reached 12.2 million (Passel and Krogstad, 2023). Unauthorized inflows then declined during the later years of the Obama administration and the first Trump presidency, before rising again after 2020. The post-2020 surge reflected a combination of factors, including Venezuela's economic and political crisis,

worsening conditions in parts of Central America, and a broader diversification in migrants’ countries of origin. By 2023, the unauthorized immigrant population had reached an all-time high of 14 million people (Passel and Krogstad, 2025). During the same period, the Biden administration adopted a more expansive humanitarian immigration policy, broadening eligibility for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), expanding humanitarian parole programs, and creating new legal pathways for migrants seeking entry into the United States. These developments coincided with immigration becoming one of the most salient political issues in the country.

Several journalistic accounts have linked recent Republican gains among voters with immigrant background, particularly Hispanics in border regions such as California and Texas, to concerns about immigration.⁸ A 2022 NBC News/Telemundo poll found that a majority of Latino voters disapproved of Biden’s handling of immigration and border security.⁹ Anecdotal accounts suggest that long-settled Hispanic immigrants distinguish between themselves and more recent arrivals.¹⁰ However, systematic evidence on whether unauthorized immigrant inflows contributed to the rightward shift of migrant-background Americans remains limited. In this section, we fill this gap.

5.1 Estimating unauthorized inflows

Our analysis focuses on unauthorized immigration from Mexico. Despite rising inflows from Central and South America, Mexico remained the largest single country of origin for unauthorized migrants, accounting for an estimated 5.5 million people, or 40% of the unauthorized population, in 2023. Mexico was also the primary country of origin for recent migrants in our three states of interest between 2014 and 2024. Based on estimates from the American Community Survey (Ruggles et al., 2025),¹¹ an average of 12% of migrants with no US-citizenship who had been in the United States for fewer than two years were Mexican: 18% in California and 14% in Nebraska and North Carolina.

We estimate local inflows of unauthorized migrants from Mexico using Mexican consular data, as in Tiburcio and Camarena (2023). The Mexican government issues identification

⁸Nadia Lathan and Valerie Gonzalez, A Texas Border County Backed Democrats for Generations. Trump Won It Decisively,” *Associated Press*, November 7, 2024, [link](#); Yue Stella Yu, A Pivotal Moment? Why Many Latino Voters in California Chose Trump,” *CalMatters*, November 15, 2024, [link](#).

⁹Mark Murray, Los votantes latinos prefieren que ganen los demócratas en noviembre pero el Partido Republicano recorta su desventaja,” *Noticias Telemundo*, October 2, 2022, [link](#).

¹⁰For example, Olga Franco, a Peruvian immigrant who had lived in the U.S. for 34 years, contrasted her unauthorized sister, who she said had never relied on the government,” with recent arrivals receiving benefits. Clarissa León, April Xu, Amir Khafagy, Fisayo Okare, Ralph Thomassaint Joseph, Lucía Cholakian Herrera, Lam Thuy Vo, and Rommel H. Ojeda, “Pro-Trump Sentiment High on Election Day Among Immigrants,” *Documented*, November 5, 2024, [link](#).

¹¹We use the ACS for 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, and 2024, omitting 2020 due to known data-quality concerns.

cards to Mexican nationals through more than fifty consulates across the U.S. To obtain a card, individuals must schedule an appointment and present proof of Mexican origin and U.S. residence. Although any Mexican national may apply, these cards are especially valuable for individuals who cannot easily obtain U.S.-issued identification but need an ID for activities such as opening a bank account. Prior work shows that these data closely track levels and changes in the unauthorized immigrant population as estimated using census data, but do not track the population of authorized immigrants (Caballero et al., 2018; Tiburcio and Camarena, 2023; Caballero et al., 2025). We build on this work and use the number of consular identification cards as a proxy for unauthorized Mexican migrants entering the U.S. These data are individual-level from 2002 to 2020 and include, among other variables, each cardholder’s U.S. county of residence, Mexican municipality of origin, and card renewal history. For 2021 to 2024, we have access only to inflows aggregated by Mexican municipality of origin.

5.2 Empirical strategy

5.2.1 Estimating equation

We focus on the sample of naturalized and second-generation consistent voters, using U.S.-born whites as the base group. We follow voters over time, controlling for time-invariant individual characteristics. We further account for group-specific partisan trends within each state, so that identification does not rely on differential trends across demographic groups. We estimate individual-level regressions of the form:

$$Y_{igct} = \beta_g \tilde{Z}_{ct} + \alpha_i + \gamma_{ct} + \lambda_{gst} + \iota_g age_i + \epsilon_{igct} \quad (2)$$

where i indexes registered voters, g indexes demographic groups (naturalized, second-generation, and U.S.-born white),¹² and c , s , and t index counties, states, and years, respectively. Y is an indicator for Republican registration. To distinguish a rightward shift from increased polarization among immigrant-background voters, we also examine Democratic and Independent registration, as well as turnout. The key regressor of interest, $\tilde{Z}_{ct}$, is the predicted share of unauthorized migrants in the county population. We describe the construction of this regressor in detail in the next subsection.

We include individual fixed effects, α_i , and group-specific controls for age, which varies within individuals over time and may influence partisanship. County-by-year fixed effects, γ_{ct} , absorb shocks common to all voters in a county-year and are collinear with the baseline effect of Z_{cst} . Including these fixed effects allows us to focus on the differential evolution of

¹²Our baseline specifications exclude U.S.-born non-white. We include this group only when analyzing specific responses by ethnicity in column 4 of Table A28.

party registration among immigrant-background voters relative to U.S.-born whites within a county. Group-by-state-by-year fixed effects, λ_{gst} , absorb group-specific shifts in partisanship within each state and year. Our coefficients of interest are β_g , which capture the differential effect of unauthorized immigration on Republican registration by migrant group. We cluster the standard errors at the county-group level, but also probe robustness to alternative ways of clustering.

Identifying variation An example illustrates the variation we exploit for identification. Consider three 68-year-old people who live in Santa Clara County, CA: one naturalized foreign-born voter, one second-generation voter, and one white U.S.-born voter. Our estimates of β_g compare how the first two voters’ probability of registering as Republican differentially changes as predicted unauthorized immigration in the county changes, net of the average Republican registration rate for voters of the same group in the same state and year, and a specific age effect for each group. Identification therefore comes from within-person changes, comparing immigrant-background voters to U.S.-born whites in the same county over time, while accounting for county-specific shocks and group-specific state-year trends.

5.2.2 Predicted immigration

We construct a measure of predicted local unauthorized inflows, $\tilde{Z}_{ct}$. The key empirical challenge in our setup is that local trends in unauthorized migration may be correlated with changes in local political and economic conditions, which may themselves affect political behavior. We therefore follow the literature that uses immigrant enclaves to construct instruments for migration (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010). We begin by constructing a shift-share instrument that combines initial U.S. county–Mexican municipality networks (shares) with predicted biennial migrant outflows from each Mexican municipality (shifts). We define the shares as the unique new cards issued for each county–municipality pair between 2002 and 2006, and interact them with the number of new cards issued to migrants from each Mexican municipality in each two-year period. We normalize this measure by the 2010 adult county population. Formally:

$$Z_{ct} = \frac{1}{P_{c,2010}} \sum_m Sh_{mc,2002-2006} \times \widehat{Migrants}_{mt} \quad (3)$$

The shifts, $Migrants_{mt}$, are proxied by new Mexican consular cards. Because these flows may depend on evolving conditions in U.S. destination counties that are themselves correlated with political trends, we use the prediction, $\widehat{Migrants}_{mt}$, from a zero-stage Poisson regression as a function of climatic and socioeconomic push factors in the municipality of

origin, in the spirit of [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#):

$$Migrants_{mt} = \sigma_m + \mathbf{X}_{mt} + \psi_{mt} \quad (4)$$

Where σ are municipality fixed effects and $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of climatic and socioeconomic push factors that vary by municipality and year. The set of climatic regressors includes lagged indicators for standard deviations from historic (1980-200) temperature and precipitation, the number of hot (mean temperature of 30 Celsius degrees or warmer) and intense-precipitation (1 inch) days per season. The set of socioeconomic regressors includes lagged values of birth rates, maternal death rates, infant death rates, and the budget of the municipality. We compute the prediction:

$$\widehat{Migrants}_{mt} = \exp(\widehat{\sigma}_m + \widehat{\mathbf{X}}_{mt}) \quad (5)$$

Importantly, because the 2021–2024 consular data report only new cards aggregated by Mexican municipality-year, we cannot estimate a first stage for this period. Table [A5](#) includes the first stage for the period 2014-2020.

The identification assumption behind a shift–share design in a panel setting such as ours is that changes in either the shares or the shifts must be orthogonal to changes in any unobserved factor that also affects changes in partisanship ([Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020](#); [Borusyak et al., 2022](#)). Even if the shocks generating emigration from Mexican municipalities are exogenous, the way these shocks are allocated across U.S. counties through migrant networks may not be random. Some counties systematically receive larger inflows — because they are closer to the border, larger, or have historical ties — and these same counties may experience different underlying changes in economic or social conditions that correlate with partisan evolution.¹³

To address this concern, we implement the re-centering correction proposed by [Borusyak and Hull \(2023\)](#). We simulate a series of counterfactual shock allocations, recompute the instrument under each of these simulated assignments, and then subtract from the realized instrument the mean counterfactual instrument. This procedure removes the component of the instrument that arises from systematic exposure — which appears in all counterfactual simulations — and retains only the variation driven by the exogenous shifters.

Practically, we generate 1,000 counterfactual predictions ($\widehat{Migrants}_{mt}$) by randomly re-assigning, within every year, all the push factors across Mexican municipalities, but keeping the municipality fixed effects in the estimation. Each simulation preserves the empirical dis-

¹³For example, border or large counties may be differentially exposed to the opioid epidemic, which is predictive of growing Republican support ([Arteaga and Barone, 2025](#)).




Figure 3: Predicted and observed unauthorized migration, 2014-2024

tribution of municipality-level shocks, within every year, but breaks their link to the original network structure. We then compute the average counterfactual exposure, μ_{ct} , and subtract it from the realized predicted exposure. By keeping the municipality fixed effects in both the zero-stage prediction and in each of the simulations, the resulting re-centered instrument isolates the exogenous variation in immigrant inflow. The instrument and is given by:

$$\tilde{Z}_{ct} = Z_{ct} - \mu_{ct} \quad (6)$$

Figure 3 displays the evolution of the (un-centered) predicted unauthorized Mexican migration throughout our period of analysis. Table A6 presents summary statistics.

5.2.3 Identifying assumptions

Our design relies on two identifying assumptions. First, changes in predicted county-level inflows of unauthorized migrants must be exogenous to county-level changes in unobserved factors that may influence party registration. In shift-share designs, validity can be motivated by a large number of shifts that are orthogonal to changes in outcomes at the destination (Borusyak et al., 2022, 2025). Our design follows this logic by using time-varying Mexican municipality-level variables that are plausibly exogenous to U.S. county-level developments to predict migrant outflows from Mexico. Through re-centering, we address the concern that these shocks may not be randomly allocated across U.S. counties. This adjustment removes variation in predicted unauthorized migration that is mechanically related to county-level

characteristics that might otherwise influence the evolution of partisanship.

Second, our empirical design in equation 2 exploits within-voter changes in party registration, net of group-by-state trends, and compares these changes among naturalized and second-generation voters to those among U.S.-born whites. County-year fixed effects absorb time-varying county-level shocks that affect immigrant-background and U.S.-born white voters in the same way. We therefore require that, conditional on our fixed effects, the difference in the evolution of party registration between immigrant-background voters and U.S.-born whites would have been similar in counties with more versus less predicted unauthorized migration.

We present two pieces of evidence in support of these identifying assumptions. First, we show that future (unrealized) migration is unrelated to contemporaneous Republican registration, providing no indication of group-specific pre-trends. Second, we show that our results are robust to controlling for the predicted evolution of key county-level socioeconomic characteristics, interacted with group fixed effects. This addresses the concern that observable time-varying county-level changes may differentially affect immigrant-background and U.S.-born white voters. Conditional on these controls, remaining differential changes in party registration can be attributed to the differential effect of predicted unauthorized inflows.

5.3 Main results

Table 1 reports results from equation (2). Point estimates correspond to β_g , the differential effect of predicted Mexican immigration on naturalized and second-generation voters relative to US-born whites. Column (1) implies that an average (absolute) change in (predicted, recentered) inflows of Mexican immigration between elections raises the probability that a naturalized voter registers Republican — relative to an otherwise-similar U.S.-born white voter in the same county and year — by 0.19 percentage points (0.16 pp for the second generation). This equals about 9% of these groups’ average biennial increase in Republican registration over 2014–2024.¹⁴ Consistent with the smaller sample size and the discussed measurement errors, the point estimates for the second-generation are noisier throughout our analyses. We interpret these results as a likely lower bound.

We next examine the evolution of these effects over time. To do so, we estimate a specification analogous to equation 2 in first differences, identifying the differential effect

¹⁴For the naturalized (second-generation), the estimated effect from Table 1 is 5.68 (4.79) percentage points. As per Table A6, the mean (absolute) change in the recentered instrument is 0.034 percentage points. By Table A14, the mean (absolute) change in the recentered instrument is 0.34 percentage points. From Table A14, it is possible to see that the average biennial increase in Republican registration for the consistent naturalized (second-generation) voters is 2.06% (1.91%).

of migration inflows by group for each of the five pairs of successive elections.¹⁵ Figure 4 plots the corresponding estimates. While we cannot reject equality of the estimates across years, the point estimates suggest that, for the naturalized, the differential effects have been consistently positive (except for the 2022 to 2024 period), peaking in the 2020 to 2022 period. The estimated gap between immigrant-background voters and US-born whites is close to zero in 2024. This temporal pattern is consistent with the dynamics of politicization of immigration relative to other national topics by the Republican Party.

Table 1: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on party registration

Model:	Republican (1)	Democrat (2)	Independent/Other (3)	Turnout (4)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)	-0.0199 (0.0181)	-0.0369* (0.0207)	-0.0941 (0.0846)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)	-0.0312 (0.0332)	-0.0167 (0.0205)	-0.1604*** (0.0554)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278
R ²	0.86020	0.84324	0.78233	0.53234
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.48	0.33	0.66
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.49	0.31	0.64
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.79

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican (column 1), Democrat (column 2), and Independent/Other (column 3), as well as voting (column 4) for Naturalized and Second generation voters. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Over the 1992–2016 period, immigration increased ideological polarization among U.S. voters, with county-level immigrant inflows leading to the election of more extreme candidates on both sides of the ideological spectrum (Matzat et al., 2026). We examine whether unauthorized Mexican migration has a similar effect on the preferences of voters with immigrant backgrounds. Columns (2) and (3) report estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is the probability of registering as a Democrat or Independent/Other. The results indicate that unauthorized inflows do not increase heterogeneity in responses among the immigrant electorate, but instead generate a shift both from Democratic and Independent to Republican registration. There is no evidence that Republican gains during this period came only from Independent voters. Table A26 in the Appendix shows that the estimated effects are similar in both direction and magnitude across the three states in our

¹⁵This regression does not have individual-fixed effects. It also replaces the county by year fixed effects (γ_{ct}) with county fixed effects (γ_{ct}) and the group by state by year fixed effects (λ_{gst}) with group by state fixed effects (λ_{gs}).




Figure 4: Differential effect relative to US-born whites over time

data, especially for the naturalized, though the estimates outside California are less precise. Given California’s substantially larger sample size, the pooled estimates are driven primarily by California in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance.

One possible explanation for the increase in Republican registration is differential voter mobilization rather than changes in partisan affiliation. To assess this possibility, we replicate our baseline analysis using voter turnout as the outcome. We report the results in column (4) of Table 1. The estimated effect for naturalized voters is statistically insignificant. Together, these findings suggest that the rightward shift we document is unlikely to be driven by differential mobilization and instead reflects changes in partisan affiliation.

Our design identifies the effect of unauthorized Mexican immigration on the registration outcomes of naturalized and second-generation voters relative to the effect for US-born whites. To get closer to the overall level effect for each group, we estimate a regression analogous to equation (2), but omit the county-by-year fixed effects. Instead, we include county-by-group fixed effects, so that the effects are identified conditional on time-invariant differences across groups in different counties, such as baseline Republican support, as well as the differential state- and group-specific trends.¹⁶ Table A27 reports the results. The

¹⁶We also interact the sum of baseline shares of municipality-level consular cards issued between 2002 and 2006 in each county with year and group indicator. This accounts for the fact that the baseline shares do not sum to one, so counties with a higher sum of shares may mechanically receive higher predicted unauthorized migration (Borusyak et al., 2025).

estimates suggest that the differential effect we identify is driven both by an increase in Republican registration among immigrant-background voters and by a shift of US-born Whites toward the Democratic Party and Independents/Others.

5.4 Robustness checks

In this section, we report additional analyses that provide support for our identification strategy and assess the robustness of our results. Our design rests on two identifying assumptions. The first is that changes in predicted unauthorized migration are orthogonal to changes in any unobserved county-specific factors that may influence party registration. We provide three pieces of evidence consistent with this assumption. First, we run equation (2) using the future (unrealized) shock. There is no significant association, as Table A18 illustrates, indicating that current migration inflows, as opposed to persistent exposure, affect Republican registration. Second, a concrete time-varying confounder that could be correlated with predicted unauthorized Mexican immigration is immigration from other countries. Interacting the county-country networks of migrants from the Census in 2000 with the national estimates of recent migrants from the ACS (i.e. individuals who are not US citizens and have been in the county for fewer than 2 years), we predict migration at the county-year level from every nationality, except from Mexico. Controlling for migration from other countries does not change the significance or size of our results (Table A17). Third, while our instrument relies on shifts in Mexican immigration that are driven by plausibly exogenous push factors at the level of the Mexican municipality, a possible concern is that some of the socioeconomic controls we use to predict outflows may be endogenous to developments at the US-county-destination level, especially for large recipient municipalities. In Table A19, we re-estimate our main analysis relying on a prediction of unauthorized Mexican outflows that uses only temperature and precipitation variables, which are more plausibly exogenous. Our estimates remain similar in direction and magnitude, but, as expected, lose precision.¹⁷

The second identification assumption is that party registration rates for immigrant-background voters and US-born whites would have evolved in parallel across counties with different trajectories of predicted unauthorized migration. While we cannot provide direct evidence for this assumption, Table A20 shows that our results remain robust to allowing voter groups in different counties to be on differential trends by a number of baseline county-level characteristics, including demographic composition, overall immigration, unemployment and

¹⁷The predictive power of climatic factors for outmigration from Mexican municipalities is lower than in our baseline specification. Most migrants from Mexico come from urban or semi-urban areas. For example the 30 main municipalities of origin, all of them urban (over 2,500 inhabitants), consistently provide around 25% of all the newcomers to the US. In line with Ibáñez et al. (2026)’s findings for El Salvador, the effects of climatic shocks on emigration rates are concentrated among agricultural households.

poverty rates, and the pre-period vote share of the Republican Party.

Another concern is that the differential effect we document for immigrant-background voters is confounded by other characteristics that vary between voters of immigrant background and others. The primary concern is that immigrants and their descendants may be more economically vulnerable and that the effect of unauthorized immigration on right-wing voting is stronger for voters of lower socioeconomic status in general, and not immigrants specifically. To examine this possibility, we augment our baseline specification with interactions of an individual’s first observed income in the L2 data, logged, with predicted unauthorized migration. Table A21 shows that, while lower-income voters are more likely to shift toward the Republican Party in response to unauthorized inflows, there is an additional differential effect for naturalized and second-generation voters that is not captured by their economic standing.

Finally, we conduct sensitivity checks to probe the robustness of our estimates. Our results remain unchanged when excluding the 0.5% of observations with conflicting information on place of birth (Table A23), when keeping a balanced panel of voters (Table A24), and when clustering the standard errors at the county-year, county-group-year, or individual levels (Table A25).

5.5 Mechanisms

Why would established migrants respond to unauthorized migration by shifting toward a conservative party with an explicitly anti-migrant platform? The literature has identified two channels that may lead immigrant-background voters to hold anti-immigrant attitudes and support restrictionist immigration agendas. The first one is economic. Similarities in skills and economic profiles may make earlier immigrants the closest substitutes for new arrivals, particularly when both groups are low-skilled. Skill substitutability may generate competition, especially in immigrant-intensive sectors such as construction and certain services, putting downward pressure on more established immigrants’ incomes (Hanson, 2009; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Clemens and Hunt, 2019) and driving anti-immigration attitudes among this group. If this is the primary mechanism at play, we would expect the strongest reactions among immigrant-background voters whose profiles are most similar to those of undocumented Mexican arrivals and who experience the most negative economic effects of undocumented inflows.

The second channel is psychological and relates to social distinction and status. Distancing from a group low in the status hierarchy, such as unauthorized immigrants who were particularly vilified by Donald Trump’s political platform across all three of his presidential campaigns and during his first term in office, may serve as a mechanism for achieving higher

status, consistent with social identity mechanisms (Shayo, 2009). If this is the primary channel at play, then responses should not be narrowly restricted to the most economically substitutable groups, but should instead be widespread among migrant-background voters who are culturally similar to new arrivals and could plausibly be bundled with them in the eyes of broader society, particularly majority whites. We might also expect stronger responses among groups that are more assimilated and socially closer to the higher-status majority, and therefore have both stronger incentives to distance themselves in order to maintain their status and lower costs of doing so (Fouka et al., 2018).

To begin disentangling these channels, we examine heterogeneous responses to unauthorized Mexican immigration by immigrant generation, ethnicity, and national origin. We distinguish between voters of Hispanic ethnicity and others. For California and Nebraska, we additionally use information on place of birth to separately examine the responses of Mexican-background voters. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix compare these groups in terms of income. Tables A3 and A4 provides additional comparisons of sectoral employment, educational attainments, and rates of home ownership. The tables indicate that the second generation, including Hispanics and Mexicans, has higher income and is less likely to be employed in immigrant-dominated sectors than naturalized voters. If economic substitutability and competition are the primary channels driving reactions to undocumented inflows, we would therefore expect these reactions to be less pronounced among these less similar voters.

Figure 5 and Table A28 in the appendix indicate that the opposite pattern holds. The shift toward Republican registration is strongest among second-generation Hispanics and otherwise comparable among naturalized voters, with other second-generation voters having an imprecise and smaller effect. When further disaggregating by country of origin, we find no additional heterogeneity between Mexicans and other Hispanics. Both groups increase their Republican registration by similar amounts, and by more than other voter groups.

To further evaluate the relevance of economic mechanisms empirically, we use household income information from L2. Like other voter-file vendors, L2 models household income, and there is evidence that these estimates correlate with true income and with administrative records (Pew Research Center, 2018).¹⁸ We use this variable to test whether exposure to unauthorized migration had heterogeneous effects on the evolution of household income across voter groups defined by ethnicity and origin.

Figure 6 and Table A29 present these results. The first observation is that there is little

¹⁸For example, according to U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), median household income in 2018 was \$77,300 in California, \$61,400 in Nebraska, and \$57,200 in North Carolina. In our sample, the corresponding medians were \$85,270, \$73,000, and \$68,000.




Figure 5: Heterogeneous effects by ethnicity and Mexican origin

evidence of negative income effects. Estimates range between -0.168 and -0.108, implying between a 0.5% and 0.36% decrease in income for an average (absolute) increase in recentered predicted immigration, which is small and consistent with the broader literature on the economic impacts of migration (Blau and Mackie, 2017; Clemens et al., 2018; Clemens, 2022). In addition, there is little evidence that these effects differ across groups. They are mainly significant for naturalized voters, particularly Hispanic naturalized voters, for whom we estimate a less pronounced Republican shift.¹⁹

Table A28 in the appendix also provides a more detailed disaggregation of effects by race, ethnicity, and immigrant generation. It shows that effects are strongest not only among second-generation Hispanics, but also among U.S.-born Hispanics, a group even further removed from undocumented Mexican immigrants in terms of economic profile and substitutability. In addition, we estimate a positive and large shift toward Republican registration among East Asian voters of all generations and US-born Black voters.

These estimates are difficult to reconcile with economic substitutability as the primary mechanism. The strongest responses emerge among Hispanic voters, while undocumented immigration also influences, albeit to a lesser extent, the political behavior of other immigrant groups. This pattern instead points toward a broader mechanism related to perceptions of immigration policy itself. One possibility is that the rapid increase in undocumented

¹⁹At the same time, the Republican shift is heterogeneous by baseline income, as shown in Table A30. Among voters of either generation and ethnicity, except second generation Hispanics, those with below-median income register a stronger Republican shift than those above the median. Second-generation Hispanic voters display little heterogeneity, with very similar effects for higher- and lower-income households.




Figure 6: Effects of undocumented immigration on log household income, by group

immigration after 2020, together with policy changes that expanded legal protections and work authorization for certain undocumented migrants, altered perceptions of fairness among earlier cohorts of immigrants and their descendants, generating a political backlash.

We investigate this mechanism by examining the role of Temporary Protected Status (TPS), one of the most consequential changes in U.S. immigration policy during the 2020–2024 period. TPS grants temporary protection from removal and work authorization to nationals of designated countries already residing in the United States who cannot safely return because of armed conflict, political instability, or environmental disasters. The number of TPS beneficiaries increased from roughly 400,000 in 2020 to nearly 1.3 million in 2025, with almost half of this increase accounted for by Venezuelan nationals, who became the largest beneficiary group. If concerns about fairness shape political responses to immigration, the expansion of TPS should amplify the backlash against undocumented immigration in places with greater exposure to TPS recipients.

The Department of Homeland Security provides data on TPS recipients by state and nationality, but not by state–nationality or county–nationality. We therefore predict TPS recipients at the country–county level using country–county networks from the 2006–2010 ACS five-year sample, under the assumption that the distribution of TPS recipients resembles the existing distribution of compatriots. Although we cannot evaluate the accuracy of our predictions at the county level, we can do so at the state level. On average, the initial shares overestimate TPS recipients in California (by a factor of 1.5) and underestimate them in Nebraska and North Carolina (by factors of 0.67 and 0.71). Accordingly, we reweight

the shares by the relative over- or underestimation for each state. We then divide counties according to whether their predicted change in TPS recipients between 2020 and 2024 lies above or below the third tercile nationally.²⁰

Figure 7 and Table A31 present the results of this analysis. Inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration increase Republican registration more among voters living in counties with larger increases in TPS recipients. This effect is particularly pronounced for second-generation. The pattern is consistent with heightened concerns about fairness in access to protected status, but also with the greater salience of immigration in these areas, which could strengthen incentives for second-generation to reduce the prominence of a migrant identity and distance themselves from these newcomers.




Figure 7: Effects of undocumented immigration by group and predicted change in TPS recipients

Finally, we consider a social mechanism that may shape responses to undocumented immigration. Beyond concerns about relative status, Jones et al. (2019) show that Spanish-speaking immigrants are especially likely to perceive discrimination. Distancing oneself from an immigrant identity may therefore serve as a strategy to reduce exposure to discrimination or social stigma (Fouka et al., 2022; Adida and Robinson, 2023), particularly when immigration becomes more politically salient and anti-immigrant rhetoric intensifies. To examine this possibility, we split the sample into terciles based on baseline Republican support among U.S.-born White voters, which we interpret as a proxy for local anti-immigrant sentiment.

²⁰We use the third tercile because the distribution of changes is highly skewed; using the median would produce samples of very different sizes.

If distancing is motivated by concerns about discrimination, the response to undocumented immigration should be stronger in areas where such concerns are more salient.

Figure 8 reports the estimated effects separately by tercile. We find no systematic heterogeneity among second-generation voters. In contrast, naturalized voters residing in the top tercile of White Republican support exhibit a larger rightward response to undocumented immigration than those in the bottom tercile. Although not definitive, this pattern is consistent with a distancing mechanism operating more strongly in environments where immigrants are more likely to perceive hostility or discrimination.




Figure 8: Effects of undocumented immigration by group and tercile of Republican registration among whites

To summarize, the heterogeneity analyses are, taken together, more consistent with social than economic channels driving the Republican shift among immigrant-background voters in response to undocumented inflows. The strongest responses appear among the second generation. They are less pronounced among the foreign-born, who are more substitutable with Mexican migrants, even though undocumented immigration has a more negative income effect on that group. We also find suggestive evidence consistent with fairness concerns in response to protections extended to undocumented migrants during the Biden years. Finally, among the foreign-born, but not the second generation, undocumented inflows may create incentives to distance in order to avoid discrimination.

6 Conclusion

Americans with immigrant backgrounds now account for roughly one-fifth of the U.S. electorate and represent one of the fastest-growing constituencies in American politics. Despite their growing electoral importance, we know remarkably little about how these voters respond to one of the defining political issues of the past decade: immigration itself. While a large literature has examined how immigration shapes the political behavior of native-born voters, much less is known about how established immigrants and their descendants react to the arrival of newer migrants. Understanding these responses is important not only for explaining recent electoral realignments in the United States, but also for understanding how immigration reshapes political coalitions in receiving societies more broadly.

In this paper, we study these questions using administrative voter registration records covering more than 20 million registered voters in California, Nebraska, and North Carolina between 2014 and 2024. We first document a broad partisan realignment among Americans with immigrant backgrounds, with naturalized and second-generation voters becoming increasingly likely to register as Republicans over the past decade. We then examine whether one of the defining developments of this period—unauthorized immigration—contributed to this shift. To do so, we combine voter registration files with newly assembled data from the Mexican Consular system and construct a shift-share measure of predicted unauthorized Mexican immigration that interacts historical municipality–county migrant networks with plausibly exogenous municipality-level push shocks. We then estimate how changes in local exposure to unauthorized immigration affected the partisan behavior of immigrant-background voters.

We find that counties experiencing larger predicted inflows of unauthorized Mexican migrants also experienced greater increases in Republican registration among naturalized and second-generation voters relative to U.S.-born Whites. These effects are concentrated in the 2020 and 2024 electoral cycles and account for a meaningful share of the broader Republican realignment among immigrant-background voters. They reflect movements away from the Democratic Party rather than increased support for Independent candidates or changes in voter turnout, and remain robust across a wide range of alternative specifications, sample restrictions, and validation exercises.

Our evidence provides little support for labor-market competition as the primary explanation for these responses. The largest Republican shifts occur among second-generation Hispanic voters and other groups that are relatively insulated from direct economic competition with undocumented Mexican migrants, while the groups experiencing the largest estimated income losses exhibit comparatively smaller political responses. Instead, the evi-

dence points toward social mechanisms. We find suggestive evidence that the expansion of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) amplified Republican responses in areas more exposed to new beneficiaries, consistent with concerns about fairness in immigration policy. We also find that naturalized voters respond more strongly in politically less welcoming environments, consistent with incentives to distance themselves from newly arriving migrants.

Our findings open several avenues for future research. First, while our evidence is most consistent with social mechanisms related to status, fairness, and identity, it remains necessarily suggestive. Further work combining administrative data with surveys or experimental evidence could help isolating these channels. Second, our analysis focuses on three states that record voters' place of birth. Extending similar analyses to additional states would help establish the external validity of our findings and assess whether similar political realignments occurred elsewhere in the United States. Finally, immigration was one of several major developments shaping American politics during this period. An important direction for future research is to compare its electoral consequences with those of other salient issues, such as housing affordability, inflation, or public safety, and to better understand how these forces jointly reshape the political preferences of immigrant-background voters.

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A Appendix

A.1 Summary statistics

Table A1: Summary statistics by group

	Naturalized	Missing birth place	Second generation	US-born Other	US-born White
Age	54.75 (15.75)	45.27 (20.29)	36.33 (15.53)	44.31 (17.95)	51.98 (18.38)
Income	107,549.61 (63083.35)	93,537.98 (57183.80)	116,198.32 (65015.57)	92,130.64 (58805.21)	105,290.91 (62500.52)
Female	0.53 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)
Observations	22,643,317	20,726,192	7,604,458	44,781,042	68,870,859
Unique voters	5,539,556	7,267,109	1,773,207	12,468,504	17,527,878

Table A2: Summary statistics by group, consistent voters

	Naturalized	Missing birth place	Second generation	US-born Other	US-born White
Age	55.99 (14.85)	53.72 (18.63)	38.91 (15.38)	47.24 (17.21)	54.08 (16.96)
Income	108,963.36 (64029.19)	89,222.60 (55561.47)	113,219.77 (64016.24)	94,107.06 (60020.69)	107,157.46 (63184.01)
Female	0.53 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)
Observations	15,809,832	8,822,036	5,410,153	29,161,751	48,975,592
Unique voters	2,782,646	1,655,361	962,305	5,732,492	9,031,189

Table A3: Socioeconomic characteristics by group (ACS 2014-18 and 2019-23)

	Recent Mex migrant	Nat Hisp	Nat Other	US-born Hisp	US-born Other	US-born White
Age	37.67 (15.87)	53.34 (15.09)	54.54 (16.51)	36.77 (16.05)	43.22 (17.80)	50.56 (18.57)
College degree	0.11 (0.32)	0.13 (0.34)	0.48 (0.50)	0.17 (0.38)	0.32 (0.47)	0.39 (0.49)
Number of children	0.79 (1.15)	1.19 (1.22)	0.85 (1.04)	0.71 (1.13)	0.57 (0.99)	0.55 (0.95)
Unemployment rate	0.10 (0.30)	0.05 (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.22)
Agriculture	0.09 (0.28)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Construction	0.07 (0.25)	0.04 (0.20)	0.01 (0.12)	0.03 (0.17)	0.01 (0.12)	0.03 (0.18)
Hospitality and leisure	0.06 (0.24)	0.04 (0.20)	0.03 (0.18)	0.05 (0.23)	0.04 (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)
Education and health	0.03 (0.16)	0.10 (0.29)	0.12 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	0.12 (0.33)	0.12 (0.32)
Trade	0.05 (0.21)	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.28)	0.11 (0.31)	0.09 (0.29)	0.09 (0.29)
Personal income	18515.9 (29339.4)	37994.2 (50252.0)	65935.1 (96588.6)	36795.9 (49734.0)	46009.7 (66856.7)	62668.7 (88132.0)
Household income	85065.5 (78874.3)	100834.5 (89618.0)	153139.94 (155340.1)	108617.7 (94161.2)	111993.1 (119929.9)	131923.1 (136073.1)
Home ownership	0.30 (0.46)	0.63 (0.48)	0.70 (0.46)	0.54 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.71 (0.45)

Displayed are the mean and standard deviation, in parentheses, of the relevant variable for each group. Recent Mexican migrants are Mexican nationals, without US citizenship, who had been in the US for fewer than 2 years, and at most college education. Naturalized (Other) Hispanics are US citizens who were born (abroad, not) in Latin America or the Caribbean, and who do (not) identify as Hispanics. US-born (Other) Hispanics are US citizens born in the US who do (or do not) identify as Hispanic. White US-born are US citizens born in the US who identify as White. The sample is restricted to people over 18 years old. Row 1 is age. Row 2 is college completion. Row 3 is the number of children in the household. Row 4 is the share of unemployed among those in the labor force. Rows 5-9 show the share of people in the workforce working in each of these sectors. Rows 10 and 11 are personal and household income. Row 12 is home ownership. Source: ACS 5

Table A4: Socioeconomic characteristics by group (CPS 2014-2024)

	Nat Hisp	Nat Other	2nd gen Hisp	2nd gen Other	US-born Hisp	US-born Other	US-born White
Age	52.50 (14.97)	54.21 (15.99)	33.60 (14.47)	43.09 (19.67)	39.00 (16.46)	45.51 (17.85)	50.22 (18.13)
College degree	0.14 (0.35)	0.52 (0.50)	0.17 (0.38)	0.49 (0.50)	0.20 (0.40)	0.26 (0.44)	0.40 (0.49)
Number of children	1.18 (1.24)	0.84 (1.05)	0.66 (1.10)	0.46 (0.89)	0.74 (1.14)	0.60 (1.02)	0.56 (0.96)
Unemployment rate	0.05 (0.22)	0.04 (0.19)	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.21)	0.09 (0.28)	0.09 (0.29)	0.04 (0.20)
Agriculture	0.03 (0.17)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.12)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.11)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.13)
Construction	0.09 (0.29)	0.02 (0.16)	0.07 (0.25)	0.03 (0.18)	0.05 (0.21)	0.04 (0.19)	0.07 (0.25)
Hospitality and leisure	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.15)	0.02 (0.15)
Education and health	0.19 (0.39)	0.24 (0.43)	0.21 (0.41)	0.24 (0.42)	0.23 (0.42)	0.26 (0.44)	0.23 (0.42)
Trade	0.12 (0.32)	0.13 (0.34)	0.17 (0.38)	0.13 (0.33)	0.16 (0.37)	0.12 (0.33)	0.13 (0.33)
Personal income	33331.5 (44871.9)	59382.3 (96282.2)	33029.7 (51455.0)	57851.4 (83748.7)	36428.8 (43190.3)	39965.9 (74139.2)	56948.3 (85262.9)
Household income	88557.6 (91757.4)	133752.0 (150986.5)	97348.0 (95317.5)	138843.7 (153571.7)	103727.2 (93322.5)	88543.8 (123007.1)	119961.9 (133351.6)
Home ownership	0.58 (0.49)	0.70 (0.46)	0.51 (0.50)	0.65 (0.48)	0.48 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.72 (0.45)

Displayed are the mean and standard deviation, in parentheses, of the relevant variable for each group.

Naturalized (Other) Hispanics are US citizens who were born (abroad, not) in Latin America or the Caribbean, and who do (not) identify as Hispanics. Second generation (Other) Hispanics are US citizens whose parents were born (abroad, not) and who do (not) identify as Hispanics. US-born (Other) Hispanics are US citizens born in the US who do (or do not) identify as Hispanic. White US-born are US citizens born in the US who identify as White. The sample is restricted to people over 18 years old. Row 1 is age. Row 2 is college completion. Row 3 is the number of children in the household. Row 4 is the share of the unemployed among those in the labor force. Rows 5-9 show the share of people in the workforce working in each of these sectors. Rows 10 and 11 are personal and household income. Row 12 is home ownership. Source: CPS ASEC.

Table A5: First stage (2014-2020)

	Unweighted	Weighted
<i>A. Only climate push factors</i>		
Unaut Mex mig (un-centered)	0.72*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.15)
Obs	1004	1004
F stat	85.77	12.02
Mean Unauth Mex mig	0.17	0.34
Sd Unauth Mex mig	0.21	0.22
Mean Pred Unauth Mex mig	0.21	0.56
Sd Pred Unauth Mex mig	0.28	0.33
<i>B. Climate and social push factors</i>		
Unaut Mex mig (un-centered)	0.74*** (0.08)	0.56*** (0.16)
Obs	1004	1004
F stat	86.95	12.52
Mean Unauth Mex mig	0.17	0.34
Sd Unauth Mex mig	0.21	0.22
Mean Pred Unauth Mex mig	0.20	0.55
Sd Pred Unauth Mex mig	0.27	0.32

Standard errors are clustered at county level. All regressions control for county and state by year fixed effects. Stars indicate *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A6: Summary statistics of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration 2014-2024

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Levels	Changes	Changes (abs)
<i>A. Un-centered</i>			
Unauthorized Mex mig	0.521 (0.307)	-0.031 (0.127)	0.098 (0.086)
<i>B. Recentered</i>			
Unauthorized Mex mig	-0.018 (0.039)	-0.006 (0.051)	0.034 (0.039)
Counties	251	251	251
Observations	1506	1255	1255

Estimates weighted by county population.

A.2 Additional Data validation

Table A7: Correlation between L2's estimated number of registered voters and population estimates in California, Nebraska and North Carolina (2014-24)

	Total	White	Hispanic	Other
<i>A. Adult population (US Census estimates)</i>				
Total registered voters	1.42*** (0.00)	1.67*** (0.01)	2.08*** (0.00)	0.80*** (0.01)
Observations	1506	1506	1506	1506
Dep. Var., Mean	2174048	769097	864239	540712
Ind. Var., Mean	1517658	470686	413587	633385
<i>B. Voting Age Population (ACS 5)</i>				
Total registered voters	1.13*** (0.00)	1.63*** (0.01)	1.43*** (0.00)	0.66*** (0.00)
Observations	753	753	753	753
Dep. Var., Mean	1797900	726105	601682	470113
Ind. Var., Mean	1573643	455469	425312	692861
<i>C. Naturalized Citizens (ACS)</i>				
Total registered voters	1.71*** (0.01)		1.67*** (0.01)	1.73*** (0.02)
Observations	338		338	338
Dep. Var., Mean	563127		227422	335705
Ind. Var., Mean	336938		138595	198343
<i>D. Naturalized Citizens (ACS 5)</i>				
Total registered voters	1.75*** (0.01)		1.70*** (0.01)	1.78*** (0.02)
Observations	176		176	176
Dep. Var., Mean	544392		220629	323763
Ind. Var., Mean	320436		132930	187505
<i>E. Adult children of Migrant Citizens (ASEC CPS)</i>				
Total registered voters	5.13*** (0.03)		5.88*** (0.02)	3.90*** (0.06)
Observations	223		223	223
Dep. Var., Mean	658413		419387	239026
Ind. Var., Mean	131222		71643	59579

Standard errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations weighted by total registered voters. Stars indicate *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A8: Correlation between estimated number of second-generation registered voters and population estimates from CPS in CA, NC and NE (2014-24)

	Total	18-33	34 and older
<i>Adult children of Migrant Citizens (ASEC CPS)</i>			
Total registered voters	5.13*** (0.03)	4.81*** (0.03)	5.44*** (0.02)
Observations	223	223	223
Dep. Var., Mean	658413	364525	293888
Ind. Var., Mean	131222	77506	53716

Standard errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations weighted by total registered voters. Stars indicate *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A9: Correlation between party registration and electoral support at the county level in California, Nebraska and North Carolina (2014-24)

	Total votes		Democratic votes		Republican votes	
	(1) Levels	(2) Changes	(3) Levels	(4) Changes	(5) Levels	(6) Changes
<i>A. House elections</i>						
Total registered voters	0.55*** (0.01)	1.11*** (0.07)	0.71*** (0.01)	1.10*** (0.02)	0.79*** (0.03)	2.02*** (0.27)
Total registered voters who voted	0.93*** (0.01)	0.88*** (0.01)	1.15*** (0.01)	1.11*** (0.01)	1.21*** (0.01)	1.42*** (0.02)
Observations	1506	1506	1506	1506	1506	1506
<i>B. Presidential elections</i>						
Total registered voters	0.69*** (0.00)	0.56*** (0.05)	0.92*** (0.01)	0.53*** (0.02)	1.05*** (0.01)	1.78*** (0.37)
Total registered voters who voted	1.01*** (0.00)	0.96*** (0.00)	1.26*** (0.01)	1.20*** (0.00)	1.41*** (0.05)	3.09*** (0.32)
Observations	753	753	753	753	753	753

Standard errors clustered at the county level. Estimations weighted by total registered voters. Stars indicate *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections.

A.2.1 Missing place of birth

Table A10: Share of registered voters with missing place of birth, by state

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	California	Nebraska	North Carolina
Share missingness (0-100)	9.941 (4.090)	47.661 (15.154)	14.579 (7.764)
Counties	58	93	100

Table A11: Share of registered voters with missing place of birth, by state, consistent voters

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	California	Nebraska	North Carolina
Share missingness (0-100)	4.920 (3.738)	39.393 (18.437)	12.469 (9.502)
Counties	58	93	100

Table A12: Correlates of share of missing birth place (2014-24)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Unaut Mexican mig, share	GOP share, presidential	GOP share, House
Share missingness (0-100)	-1.523 (5.899)	-0.093 (0.058)	-0.066 (0.050)
Counties (obs)	251	251	251

Robust standard errors. Stars indicate *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. Dependent variable is the share of missing place of birth in the county. Covariates are variables in the columns

Table A13: Correlates of share of missing birth place (2014-24)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Unaut Mexican mig, share	GOP share, presidential	GOP share, House
Share missingness (0-100)	-5.136 (6.601)	-0.075 (0.068)	-0.049 (0.058)
Counties (obs)	251	251	251

Robust standard errors. Stars indicate *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. Dependent variable is the share of missing place of birth in the county. Covariates are variables in the columns

A.3 Changers to Republican registration by group

Table A14: Consistent voters who changed party registration

Group	Year	Total voters	From Republican		To Republican		No change	
Naturalized	2014	2,181,516	-	-	-	-	-	-
Naturalized	2016	2,739,156	33,012	1.51%	30,034	1.38%	1,805,284	82.75%
Naturalized	2018	2,709,568	33,665	1.23%	19,507	0.71%	2,504,801	91.44%
Naturalized	2020	2,762,513	46,536	1.72%	101,400	3.74%	2,341,940	86.43%
Naturalized	2022	2,760,624	33,570	1.22%	49,359	1.79%	2,541,925	92.01%
Naturalized	2024	2,656,455	32,946	1.19%	79,912	2.89%	2,389,813	86.57%
US-born Other	2014	4,985,032	-	-	-	-	-	-
US-born Other	2016	6,637,601	71,883	1.44%	66,129	1.33%	4,365,383	87.57%
US-born Other	2018	6,519,353	73,267	1.10%	43,720	0.66%	6,044,682	91.07%
US-born Other	2020	6,652,645	101,812	1.56%	153,915	2.36%	5,800,415	88.97%
US-born Other	2022	6,607,913	69,566	1.05%	92,762	1.39%	6,154,613	92.51%
US-born Other	2024	6,581,243	62,227	0.94%	142,153	2.15%	6,043,935	91.47%
Second generation	2014	698,626	-	-	-	-	-	-
Second generation	2016	942,988	17,597	2.52%	10,984	1.57%	557,315	79.77%
Second generation	2018	933,055	14,813	1.57%	6,981	0.74%	843,356	89.43%
Second generation	2020	952,980	21,083	2.26%	26,299	2.82%	789,215	84.58%
Second generation	2022	953,043	13,025	1.37%	17,183	1.80%	864,282	90.69%
Second generation	2024	929,461	10,418	1.09%	28,470	2.99%	828,353	86.92%
US-born White	2014	7,165,729	-	-	-	-	-	-
US-born White	2016	8,395,221	119,980	1.67%	148,749	2.08%	6,313,921	88.11%
US-born White	2018	8,372,494	150,816	1.80%	83,834	1.00%	7,750,178	92.32%
US-born White	2020	8,554,458	188,345	2.25%	266,333	3.18%	7,486,415	89.42%
US-born White	2022	8,557,647	146,667	1.71%	125,562	1.47%	8,005,320	93.58%

Displayed are the number of voters who, from one electoral cycle to the other one, changed or kept their party registration. The sample is restricted to voters who were registered in two consecutive elections. The shares are relative to the total voters in the previous election.

A.4 Evolution of partisan registration




Table A15: Evolution of Republican registration by groups

Model:	State (1)	County (2)	County by Gender+ Age (3)	Individual (4)	Individual (consist) (5)
2016 × Naturalized	-0.019*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.019*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
2016 × Missing BPL	-0.031*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)	-0.015*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
2016 × Second Generation	-0.034*** (0.000)	-0.034*** (0.000)	-0.030*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)
2016 × US-born Other	-0.033*** (0.000)	-0.032*** (0.000)	-0.029*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)
2016 × US-born White	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)
2018 × Naturalized	-0.030*** (0.000)	-0.031*** (0.000)	-0.034*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)
2018 × Missing BPL	-0.053*** (0.000)	-0.042*** (0.000)	-0.032*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)
2018 × Second Generation	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.050*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.021*** (0.000)
2018 × US-born Other	-0.046*** (0.000)	-0.047*** (0.000)	-0.044*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)
2018 × US-born White	-0.018*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
2020 × Naturalized	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)
2020 × Missing BPL	-0.046*** (0.000)	-0.032*** (0.000)	-0.017*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
2020 × Second Generation	-0.051*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.050*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)	-0.015*** (0.000)
2020 × US-born Other	-0.040*** (0.000)	-0.042*** (0.000)	-0.040*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)
2020 × US-born White	-0.014*** (0.000)	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.018*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)
2022 × Naturalized	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)
2022 × Missing BPL	-0.047*** (0.000)	-0.034*** (0.000)	-0.016*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)
2022 × Second Generation	-0.051*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.053*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)
2022 × US-born Other	-0.036*** (0.000)	-0.040*** (0.000)	-0.040*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
2022 × US-born White	-0.021*** (0.000)	-0.025*** (0.000)	-0.028*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
2024 × Naturalized	0.019*** (0.000)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.037*** (0.000)	0.035*** (0.000)
2024 × Missing BPL	-0.038*** (0.000)	-0.023*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	0.022*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.000)
2024 × Second Generation	-0.031*** (0.000)	-0.032*** (0.000)	-0.037*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)
2024 × US-born Other	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.000)
2024 × US-born White	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.022*** (0.000)	-0.026*** (0.000)	0.013*** (0.000)	0.010*** (0.000)
Observations	164,625,868	164,625,864	164,474,120	157,238,749	108,179,364
R ²	0.05529	0.09554	0.10950	0.87244	0.85931

Standard-errors clustered at the individual-level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A16: Evolution of party registration by groups, controlling for individual and county-level variables

Dependent Variables: Model:	Republican (1)	Democrat (2)	Independent/Other (3)
2016 × Naturalized	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
2016 × Second Generation	0.000 (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)
2016 × US-born Other	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.046*** (0.001)	-0.042*** (0.001)
2016 × US-born White	0.027*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.000)	0.024*** (0.000)
2018 × Naturalized	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
2018 × Second Generation	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
2018 × US-born Other	-0.010*** (0.000)	0.040*** (0.001)	-0.030*** (0.001)
2018 × US-born White	0.018*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.000)	0.033*** (0.001)
2020 × Naturalized	0.013*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
2020 × Second Generation	0.002 (0.003)	0.023*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.004)
2020 × US-born Other	0.005*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.001)	-0.041*** (0.001)
2020 × US-born White	0.032*** (0.001)	-0.060*** (0.001)	0.028*** (0.001)
2022 × Naturalized	0.016*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)
2022 × Second Generation	0.004 (0.003)	0.043*** (0.004)	-0.047*** (0.004)
2022 × US-born Other	0.006*** (0.001)	0.052*** (0.001)	-0.057*** (0.001)
2022 × US-born White	0.026*** (0.001)	-0.047*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)
2024 × Naturalized	0.039*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.034*** (0.002)
2024 × Second Generation	0.027*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.004)	-0.060*** (0.004)
2024 × US-born Other	0.025*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.001)	-0.062*** (0.001)
2024 × US-born White	0.038*** (0.001)	-0.051*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)
Observations	132,809,113	132,809,113	132,809,113
R ²	0.88510	0.87127	0.82232

Displayed is the biennial change in the likelihood of being registered for each group. The estimations control for individual and county fixed effects, age and household income, county unemployment rate, share of county employment in the sectors of trade, manufacturing, and education and health, as well as index of violent crime. Standard-errors clustered at the individual-level. Source: L2, BLS' LAUS, QCEW, and FBI UCR. Stars indicate: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1

A.5 Robustness checks

Table A17: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration controlling for predicted migration from other countries

Model:	Baseline (1)	Other migration (2)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)	0.0575** (0.0245)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)	0.0485* (0.0284)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278
R ²	0.86020	0.86020
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.20
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.39

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican by groups. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Estimations control by individual, year by county, and year by state by group fixed effects. Column 1 is the baseline, and column 2 controls by recent migration from everywhere except Mexico. This variable is constructed by interacting 2000 county-country shares from the Census with yearly national estimates of migrants who had been in the country for fewer than 2 years. Sources: ACS and Census. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A18: Association between future (unrealized) predicted unauthorized Mexican migration and Republican registration

Model:	Republican registration	
	(1)	(2)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized (2-year lead)	0.0172 (0.0432)	
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation (2-year lead)	-0.0219 (0.0291)	
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized (4-year lead)		0.0127 (0.0385)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation (4-year lead)		-0.0045 (0.0358)
Observations	56,415,029	44,243,414
R ²	0.88315	0.90616
Mean: Naturalized	0.19	0.19
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.39

Displayed is the association between the future predicted unauthorized Mexican migration and the current likelihood of being registered as Republican for Naturalized and Second generation voters. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A19: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on party registration, only using climate push factors

Model:	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0372 (0.0238)	-0.0073 (0.0176)	-0.0299 (0.0200)	-0.0885 (0.0775)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0351 (0.0259)	-0.0291 (0.0300)	-0.0060 (0.0197)	-0.1288** (0.0545)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278
R ²	0.86020	0.84324	0.78233	0.53234
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.48	0.33	0.66
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.49	0.31	0.64
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.79

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican (column 1), Democrat (column 2), and Independent/Other (column 3), as well as voting (column 4) for Naturalized and Second generation voters. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A20: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration controlling for evolution of key covariates

Model:	% White (1)	% Black (2)	% Hispanic (3)	% Foreign (4)	Unemp (5)	Poverty (6)	% GOP (7)
Unaut Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0539** (0.0267)	0.0678*** (0.0234)	0.0533* (0.0303)	0.0554** (0.0224)	0.0374* (0.0194)	0.0510** (0.0201)	0.1069*** (0.0305)
Unaut Mex mig x Second gen	0.0437* (0.0245)	0.0656*** (0.0228)	0.0218 (0.0255)	0.0451 (0.0315)	0.0423* (0.0246)	0.0509** (0.0214)	0.0962*** (0.0285)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278
R ²	0.86020	0.86020	0.86020	0.86021	0.86021	0.86020	0.86020
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican by groups. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Estimations control by individual, year by county, and year by state by group fixed effects; as well as for year dummies, interacted with group indicators and the relevant correlate. Columns 1-3 control for the 2005 share of White, Black, and Hispanic county population, respectively. Column 4 controls for the 2010 share of foreign-born population. Columns 5-6 control for the 2005 unemployment and poverty rates. Column 7 controls for the 2006 vote share of the Republican Party. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A21: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration and income on Republican registration

Model:	(1)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0538** (0.0240)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0466* (0.0278)
Unauthorized Mex mig × First observed income	-0.0229*** (0.0054)
Observations	69,860,360
R ²	0.86015
Mean: Naturalized	0.20
Mean: Second generation	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group, controlling for the first observed household income and its interaction with unauthorized Mexican migration. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county and group level. Household income is provided by L2. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A22: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on moving

Model:	Change county (1)	Change Census Block (2)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0097 (0.0365)	0.0278 (0.0614)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	-0.0270 (0.0632)	0.0007 (0.0734)
Observations	56,415,029	56,415,029
R ²	0.31286	0.40062
Mean: Naturalized	0.02	0.18
Mean: Second generation	0.05	0.21
Mean: US-born White	0.04	0.21

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of moving counties (column 1) or census blocks (column 2). White US-born voters are the omitted category. Estimations control by individual, year by county, and year by state by group fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A23: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, excluding voters with contradicting birthplace

Model:	Baseline (1)	No problematic (2)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)	0.0569** (0.0241)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)	0.0478* (0.0278)
Observations	69,917,278	69,643,358
R ²	0.86020	0.85988
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.20
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.39

Displayed is the differential effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican by group. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 excludes voters with contradicting birth place. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A24: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, only for always-registered voters

Model:	Baseline (1)	Always registered (2)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)	0.0435** (0.0196)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)	0.0673*** (0.0230)
Observations	69,917,278	51,852,524
R ²	0.86020	0.86375
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.21
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.21
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.40

Displayed is the differential effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican by group. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 is limited to voters who are registered all years between 2014 and 2024. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A25: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, with different standard errors

Model:	Baseline (1)	County (2)	County+year (3)	County+group+year (4)	Person (5)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)	0.0568* (0.0313)	0.0568** (0.0283)	0.0568*** (0.0217)	0.0568*** (0.0038)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)	0.0479* (0.0265)	0.0479** (0.0189)	0.0479** (0.0206)	0.0479*** (0.0061)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278	69,917,278
R ²	0.86020	0.86020	0.86020	0.86020	0.86020
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Column 1 is the baseline, with standard errors clustered at the county group level. Column 2 clusters the standard errors at the county level; column 3 at county year level; column 4 at county, year group level, and column 5 at the individual-level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

A.6 Additional analysis

Table A26: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on party registration, by state

Model:	California			Nebraska			North Carolina		
	Rep (1)	Dem (2)	Ind/Other (3)	Rep (4)	Dem (5)	Ind/Other (6)	Rep (7)	Dem (8)	Ind/Other (9)
Unaut Mex mig x Nat	0.0553** (0.0253)	-0.0180 (0.0188)	-0.0373* (0.0216)	0.0285 (0.0905)	-0.0739 (0.0779)	0.0454* (0.0236)	0.1052 (0.0707)	-0.0608* (0.0341)	-0.0444 (0.0510)
Unaut Mex mig x 2nd gen	0.0480 (0.0290)	-0.0315 (0.0346)	-0.0165 (0.0213)	-0.0400 (0.0727)	-0.0123 (0.0864)	0.0523 (0.0764)	0.0418 (0.0575)	-0.0101 (0.0354)	-0.0317 (0.0363)
Observations	52,044,093	52,044,093	52,044,093	2,476,841	2,476,841	2,476,841	15,396,344	15,396,344	15,396,344
R ²	0.84426	0.82706	0.75191	0.88554	0.88355	0.83968	0.89103	0.88305	0.86166
Mean: Naturalized	0.19	0.49	0.32	0.32	0.44	0.24	0.20	0.37	0.43
Mean: Second generation	0.18	0.51	0.31	0.45	0.33	0.22	0.29	0.33	0.38
Mean: US-born White	0.36	0.40	0.25	0.54	0.27	0.19	0.44	0.23	0.34

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group for each state. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county and group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1

Table A27: Total effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on party registration

Model:	Republican (1)	Democrat (2)	Independent/Other (3)	Turnout (4)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0486* (0.0259)	-0.0371 (0.0316)	-0.0114 (0.0244)	-0.2524 (0.1533)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0402 (0.0369)	-0.0542 (0.0627)	0.0140 (0.0426)	-0.3410*** (0.1274)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born White	-0.0384 (0.0289)	0.0293 (0.0392)	0.0091 (0.0221)	-0.2075*** (0.0744)
Observations	69,917,275	69,917,275	69,917,275	69,917,275
R ²	0.85984	0.84276	0.78217	0.53074
Mean: Naturalized	0.20	0.48	0.33	0.66
Mean: Second generation	0.19	0.49	0.31	0.64
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.79

Displayed is the total effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican (column 1), Democrat (column 2), and Independent/Other (column 3), as well as voting (column 4) for Naturalized and Second generation voters. Standard errors clustered at the county by group level. Estimations control by individual, county, and election year by group by state fixed effects; as well as by the sum of shares interacted with a group indicator. Stars indicate: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1

Table A28: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by detailed origin

Model:	Baseline (1)	Detailed (Hispanic) (2)	Detailed (Mex) (3)	Detailed (ethnicity) (4)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0568** (0.0241)			
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0479* (0.0278)			
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Hispanic		0.0464** (0.0218)	0.0688* (0.0360)	0.0508*** (0.0193)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Other		0.0715*** (0.0255)	0.0698*** (0.0267)	-0.0025 (0.0303)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Hispanic		0.0702** (0.0342)	0.0926** (0.0407)	0.0754** (0.0320)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Other		0.0082 (0.0129)	0.0064 (0.0129)	
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Mexican			0.0453 (0.0296)	
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Mexican			0.0638 (0.0402)	
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized East Asian				0.1310*** (0.0252)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized South Asian				0.0185 (0.0361)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Sub-Saharan African				0.0316 (0.0326)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation East Asian				0.0303 (0.0201)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Other				-0.0102 (0.0164)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation South Asian				0.0192 (0.0455)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Sub-Saharan African				-0.0217 (0.0483)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born Black				0.0963** (0.0444)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born East Asian				0.0724*** (0.0178)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born Hispanic				0.0742*** (0.0216)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born Other				0.0077 (0.0103)
Unauthorized Mex mig x US-born US-born South Asian				0.0510** (0.0255)
Observations	69,917,278	69,917,278	54,520,934	99,282,856
R ²	0.86020	0.86022	0.84829	0.85639
Mean: Naturalized	0.20			
Mean: Second generation	0.19			
Mean: US-born White	0.39			
Mean: Naturalized Hispanic		0.39	0.37	0.39
Mean: Naturalized Other		0.13	0.15	0.13
Mean: Second generation Hispanic		0.23	0.23	0.26
Mean: Second generation Other		0.15	0.15	0.15
Mean: Second generation Mexican		0.23	0.22	0.30
Mean: Naturalized Mexican			0.11	
Mean: Second generation Mexican			0.14	
Mean: Naturalized East Asian				0.25
Mean: Naturalized South Asian				0.11
Mean: Naturalized Sub-Saharan African				0.10
Mean: Second generation East Asian				0.19
Mean: Second generation South Asian				0.11
Mean: Second generation Sub-Saharan African				0.11
Mean: US-born Hispanic				0.19
Mean: US-born East Asian				0.22
Mean: US-born South Asian				0.15
Mean: US-born Black				0.02
Mean: US-born Other				0.31

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of being registered as Republican. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 further divides the immigrant-background voters by Hispanic ethnicity. Column 3, restricted to California and Nebraska, further divides the immigrant-background voters by Mexican background. Column 4 breaks down the groups by specific ethnic background, including non White US-born. Estimations control by individual, year by county, and year by state by relevant group fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county by relevant group level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A29: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on modeled (log) household income

Model:	Baseline (1)	Detailed (2)	Detailed (Mex) (3)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	-0.1685*** (0.0440)		
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	-0.1080 (0.0774)		
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Hispanic		-0.1544*** (0.0594)	-0.0499 (0.1166)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized Other		-0.1053 (0.0763)	-0.1011 (0.0799)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Hispanic		-0.1272 (0.0884)	-0.0159 (0.1316)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation Other		-0.0450 (0.0955)	-0.0423 (0.0995)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Mexican			-0.2100*** (0.0560)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Mexican			-0.2101** (0.0850)
Observations	58,889,685	58,889,685	45,925,647
R ²	0.61964	0.61976	0.62120
Mean: Naturalized	11.40		
Mean: Second generation	11.46		
Mean: US-born White	11.39	11.39	11.45
Mean: Naturalized Hispanic		11.16	11.19
Mean: Naturalized Other		11.54	11.55
Mean: Second generation Hispanic		11.26	11.27
Mean: Second generation Other		11.63	11.65
Mean: Naturalized Mexican			11.14
Mean: Second generation Mexican			11.24

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on (log) household income. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 further divides the immigrant-background voters by Hispanic ethnicity. Column 3, restricted to California and Nebraska, further divides the immigrant-background voters by Mexican background. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by relevant group by state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county and relevant group level. Household income is provided by L2. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A30: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by household income

Model:	Below med (1)	Above med (2)	Below med (3)	Above med (4)	Below med (5)	Above med (6)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized	0.0665 (0.0604)	0.0463** (0.0232)				
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation	0.0329 (0.0487)	0.0108 (0.0233)				
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized Hispanic			0.0475 (0.0376)	0.0155 (0.0242)		
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized Other			0.1266** (0.0633)	0.0629*** (0.0238)		
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation Hispanic			0.0272 (0.0386)	0.0535 (0.0333)		
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation Other			0.0125 (0.0338)	-0.0293 (0.0180)		
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized Hispanic					0.0967 (0.0679)	0.0279 (0.0336)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized Mexican					0.0488 (0.0420)	0.0154 (0.0307)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Naturalized Other					0.1240* (0.0656)	0.0582** (0.0245)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation Hispanic					0.0981* (0.0502)	0.0384 (0.0451)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation Mexican					0.0103 (0.0442)	0.0583 (0.0506)
Unaut Mex mig $\times$ Second generation Other					0.0054 (0.0343)	-0.0329* (0.0182)
Observations	28,022,984	31,943,003	28,022,984	31,943,003	21,983,794	24,752,199
R ²	0.87675	0.87656	0.87678	0.87657	0.86629	0.86626
Mean: Naturalized	0.21	0.21				
Mean: Second generation	0.21	0.21				
Mean: US-born White	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.38
Mean: Naturalized Hispanic			0.17	0.16	0.19	0.18
Mean: Naturalized Other			0.23	0.22	0.23	0.22
Mean: Second generation Hispanic			0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18
Mean: Second generation Other			0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Mean: Naturalized Mexican					0.14	0.14
Mean: Second generation Mexican					0.17	0.17

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group for households with household income below or above median the median value of their state the first year their income is non-missing. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 further divides the immigrant-background voters by Hispanic ethnicity. Column 3, restricted to California and Nebraska, further divides the immigrant-background voters by Mexican background. Standard errors clustered at the county and group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Household income is provided by L2. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A31: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by predicted TPS

Model:	Tercile 1-2 (1)	Tercile 3 (2)	Tercile 1-2 (3)	Tercile 3 (4)	Tercile 1-2 (5)	Tercile 3 (6)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized	0.0391* (0.0225)	0.0621 (0.0688)				
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation	0.1051*** (0.0338)	0.2438 (0.1479)				
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Hispanic			0.0446 (0.0353)	-0.0263 (0.1076)		
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Other			0.0379 (0.0302)	0.0486 (0.0558)		
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Hispanic			0.1269*** (0.0231)	0.1237 (0.1436)		
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Other			0.0436 (0.0306)	0.1522 (0.1167)		
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Hispanic					0.0556 (0.0749)	0.0227 (0.1153)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Mexican					0.0438 (0.0333)	-0.0804 (0.2946)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Naturalized Other					0.0295 (0.0320)	0.0484 (0.0628)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Hispanic					0.1404*** (0.0447)	0.1368 (0.1532)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Mexican					0.1261*** (0.0245)	0.4768*** (0.1435)
Unauthorized Mex mig × Second generation Other					0.0407 (0.0323)	0.2892*** (0.0920)
Observations	29,050,709	6,603,143	29,050,709	6,603,143	23,512,502	4,281,023
R ²	0.93441	0.94239	0.93441	0.94240	0.92889	0.93294
Mean: Naturalized	0.25	0.25				
Mean: Second generation	0.25	0.26				
Mean: US-born White	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
Mean: Naturalized Hispanic			0.16	0.17	0.22	0.24
Mean: Naturalized Other			0.29	0.33	0.29	0.33
Mean: Second generation Hispanic			0.18	0.20	0.20	0.23
Mean: Second generation Other			0.28	0.33	0.28	0.33
Mean: Naturalized Mexican					0.13	0.15
Mean: Second generation Mexican					0.17	0.19

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group for voters in counties that with predicted TPS recipients as share of population in the first two and top three terciles of the national distribution, respectively. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Column 1 is the baseline. Column 2 further divides the immigrant-background voters by Hispanic ethnicity. Column 3, restricted to California and Nebraska, further divides the immigrant-background voters by Mexican background. Standard errors clustered at the county and relevant group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by relevant group by state fixed effects. Source: DHS and ACS 5. Stars indicate: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1

Table A32: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by 2016 census tract GOP support

Model:	Republican share			Republican share, US-born White		
	Tercile 1 (1)	Tercile 2 (2)	Tercile 3 (3)	Tercile 1 (4)	Tercile 2 (5)	Tercile 3 (6)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0380 (0.0244)	0.0791** (0.0311)	0.0640*** (0.0214)	0.0506* (0.0272)	0.0743*** (0.0259)	0.0782*** (0.0276)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0899*** (0.0294)	0.0482 (0.0426)	0.0380 (0.0235)	0.0593* (0.0307)	0.0754 (0.0471)	0.0429 (0.0262)
Observations	16,061,254	21,475,983	24,825,082	17,104,570	20,960,736	24,260,625
R ²	0.84186	0.86896	0.87959	0.84900	0.87457	0.87822
Mean: US-born White	0.15	0.34	0.51	0.16	0.36	0.52
Mean: Naturalized	0.13	0.22	0.31	0.14	0.20	0.28
Mean: Second generation	0.10	0.20	0.34	0.11	0.19	0.30

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group. The sample is divided, in columns 1-3 by terciles of share of Republican voters in census tracts in 2016, and in columns 4-6 by the share of Republican voters only among White voters. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county and group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table A33: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by 2016 census tract demographic composition

Model:	Hispanic share			US-born White share		
	Tercile 1 (1)	Tercile 2 (2)	Tercile 3 (3)	Tercile 1 (4)	Tercile 2 (5)	Tercile 3 (6)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Naturalized	0.0414*** (0.0147)	0.0517** (0.0247)	0.0431 (0.0306)	0.0772*** (0.0255)	0.0280 (0.0175)	0.0260 (0.0251)
Unauthorized Mex mig x Second generation	0.0208 (0.0169)	0.0383** (0.0169)	0.0172 (0.0411)	0.0507 (0.0491)	0.0395** (0.0198)	0.0257 (0.0236)
Observations	24,396,516	23,406,843	14,669,313	16,439,533	23,150,905	22,903,978
R ²	0.89377	0.87001	0.85476	0.84506	0.87119	0.89145
Mean: US-born White	0.42	0.37	0.33	0.28	0.36	0.45
Mean: Naturalized	0.22	0.22	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.26
Mean: Second generation	0.26	0.22	0.14	0.13	0.23	0.32

Displayed is the effect of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on the likelihood of Republican registration by group. The sample is divided, in columns 1-3 by terciles of the share of Hispanic voters in census tracts in 2016, and in columns 4-6 by the share of US-born White voters. White US-born voters are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the county and group level. Estimations control by individual, election year by county, and election year by group by state fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1